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If there is one organizational attribute that differentiates cooperatives from other organizations, it is the way they are 
governed. By construction, cooperatives put the economic interests of a particular class of patron in front all other 
stakeholders, and look to patron owners for risk capital and leadership on elected governing boards. More commonly, 
the interests of investors, working partners, or sole proprietors are primary, and patron interests are protected through 
competition in the marketplace. Membership on governing boards, if they exist, is heavily influenced, if not chosen 
directly, by management. 
These differences create challenges and opportunities for effective governance in cooperatives. On the one hand, 
patron board members have good information, and strong economic motive, to perform the monitoring role normally 
ascribed to governing boards. Electing board members from among patrons can also help maintain strong patron 
relationships. On the other hand, patrons may lack the business expertise that is needed to advise management 
regarding strategy. Similarly, patrons who contribute capital might show greater purchase loyalty to their cooperative, 
but relying on retained earnings as the sole source of risk capital can limit firm growth. Effective cooperative leaders 
manage these trade–offs to a net advantage. 
More fundamentally, however, are the unique consequences for governance that arise from the root cause of 
cooperative enterprise, and from the special life-cycle issues that emerge as a result. These consequences become 
more important as cooperatives mature and grow, particularly in market settings where they are one option among 
many for patronage. 
Why Cooperatives? 
There are a handful of industrial sectors where cooperatives account for a significant fraction of economic activity. In 
each of these sectors, there is a unique story to tell about how markets failed to satisfy patron needs. 
Arguably, the story for the agricultural sector is about market power (Taylor, 1953). Spatial and temporal features of 
farming severely limit opportunities to achieve region-wide scale economies. Despite significant consolidation in 
farming over time, relatively small, autonomous, and typically familial, production units still supply the vast majority of 
primary farm-level output. In contrast, relatively large agribusiness firms supply the majority of inputs that farmers 
use, and control the processing, marketing, and distribution of farm output to final consumers. 
The market power that farmers face as individuals provides strong motivation for collective action. Acting together, 
farmers can improve market performance in the aggregate, and generate redistribution of economic surplus from 
input-supply and intermediation sectors to the farm sector. Many of the cooperatives that exist today in agricultural 
markets were created decades ago to achieve exactly these outcomes. 
This history is important for governance because the pro-competitive effect of cooperative enterprise, while apparent 
to the initial generation of cooperators, is mostly invisible to the current generation. The short-run effect of successful 
cooperative formation is transformative, providing balance and opportunity in the marketplace to a formerly 
disadvantaged group. In the long run, however, competitors respond to generate new market dynamics. As time passes, established cooperatives can be taken for granted and viewed as indistinguishable from their competitors in 
the eyes of patrons. 
And yet, where would the market be without a cooperative presence? If there is any reason for using the unique 
governance and financial structure of a cooperative business, it is to move the market in favor of patrons. As a 
consequence, it is impossible to understand and communicate cooperative value without recognizing how 
cooperatives affect outcomes in the marketplace. 
Communicating Cooperative Value to Members 
Assuming that cooperatives exist in the agricultural sector to level the economic playing field for farmers, let’s think 
for a moment about how to value a cooperative business. In doing so, it will become clear why it is so difficult to 
communicate value to members. 
For a publicly traded company, its stock price reflects the expected discounted value of future cash flows—dividends 
and capital gains—to stockholders. At any given moment, equilibrium stock price reflects investor beliefs about what 
these cash flows will be in the future, which implicitly provides a well-informed estimate of firm value to investor 
owners. There is no stock price for a cooperative business, but in principle it is still possible to estimate firm value for 
patron owners in terms of expected discounted future cash flows. 
In practice, however, if we look just at the expected discounted value of cash flows provided to patrons directly 
through prices and earnings—or savings—distributions, we will miss most of the value provided by a cooperative, 
which instead accrues indirectly through a shift in market equilibrium. 
Consider the following example. A group of farmers currently purchases all of their fertilizer from ABC Farm Supply, 
Inc. ABC faces limited competition in the area so it charges a high price. To be concrete, let's say there are 100 
farmers, and ABC currently charges $1/unit for its fertilizer. Now imagine that half the farmers in the area form a 
fertilizer-purchasing cooperative. They estimate that, by hiring a manager who will purchase for them on a wholesale 
basis—but with direct delivery to individual farms so there is no need for investment in plant and equipment—they will 
acquire fertilizer at $0.90/unit, $0.10 cheaper than they are currently paying. If they could recruit more farmer 
members into their group, they could perhaps earn even greater savings. Let's assume the cooperative forms with 50 
members and that each farmer member can now acquire fertilizer at $0.90/unit. Assume moreover that ABC matches 
this price to keep its remaining patrons. 
Now imagine trying to value the cooperative business that these farmers have formed. What is the cooperative 
worth? The cooperative firm itself has nothing to show on its financial statements. It has no assets or liabilities. It 
generates cash flow to pay for managerial service, but otherwise passes earnings on to members in the form of a 
lower price for fertilizer. Moreover, because ABC matches the cooperative price, patron members do not experience 
a savings relative to the market price for fertilizer. For this cooperative, financial statements significantly under report 
value. 
Clearly the cooperative has created value, but where, and how does management measure it? The cooperative 
established a new market equilibrium that serves all patron interests. To measure cooperative value fully, 
management must estimate cost savings relative to market equilibrium without the cooperative. Taking this value into 
account, the firm generates an earnings increase of $0.10 for 50 members in perpetuity. Using a discount rate of 
10%, this amounts to a present discounted value of $50. But that's not all the value the cooperative creates. There 
are also the cost savings that nonmembers receive as a result of improved competition. This savings generates an 
additional $50 in aggregate value for nonmembers, resulting in a total firm value of $100. Will patron owners of this 
cooperative understand that their cooperative is worth $50—and that it generates a further market-wide benefit of 
$50? Perhaps they would if market competition was this simple, but of course it is not. In the messy day-to-day 
challenges of managing cooperatives and competing in real-world agricultural markets, it is easy to lose sight of the 
unique impacts that cooperatives generate for members and other market participants. 
As a consequence, making sure that patron owners do understand the worth of their cooperative is central to 
effective cooperative governance. Unfortunately, there is no easy way to estimate and communicate this value. To 
the extent that competitors of a cooperative match the cooperative price, as in the example above, there will be no 
savings that can be demonstrated, relative to competitors. This is a common predicament for cooperative managers. 
To the extent that a cooperative generates value that does not show up on its financial statements, the onus is on 
management and the board to communicate this indirect value to members. Without doing so, a cooperative risks becoming just another business to its patron owners, but straddled with the managerial handicaps associated with 
operating on a cooperative basis. 
Implications for Board Governance 
The special value created by cooperatives points to a unique role for cooperative directors as ambassadors to 
patrons and the public at large. In addition to the standard roles of directors in noncooperative firms—monitoring and 
advising management—cooperative directors must also communicate unique impacts effectively. 
Traditionally, the democratic governance process of cooperative enterprise is interpreted as a representational 
mechanism. Elected members whose responsibility is to protect local interests in firm-level strategic decisions 
represent regional interests on the board. However, this view clashes with the fiduciary responsibility each board 
member has to protect cooperative interests at the corporate level. It is easy to think of examples where preserving 
regional interests comes into direct conflict with corporate survival. From the perspective of managing a business, 
accommodating regional interests seemingly is a handicap that limits strategic flexibility. 
However, there is a countervailing benefit: democratic governance with regional representation by patrons provides a 
unique capacity to seek maximal market share while offering a credible claim for protecting patron interests at the 
corporate level. If the patron population is represented on the board with full authority to direct corporate policy, 
members can be assured that any market power exercised by the cooperative is to their favor. Further, in instances 
where the market power exercised by a cooperative is not immediately apparent, patron board members can offer a 
credible insider view of industry competition. By explaining to members how their cooperative nudges the market in 
favor of patron economic interests, they can further establish patron loyalty. 
Of course, there will always be limits to how far a given cooperative can push its market boundaries. Inevitably, 
expanding regional and sectoral coverage leads to more diversity among patron owners. To achieve maximal scale 
efficiency and market impact, cooperative leaders must recognize and justify differential treatment of patron owners 
based on their relative contributions to the firm. Attracting new members from a different region, for example, may 
require offering prices that are superior to those provided to existing members. When some existing members object 
that doing so is not fair, as inevitably they will, it is the responsibility of leadership to explain why fair can often mean 
unequal, and how current membership will benefit from adding new membership. Similarly, when closing a local 
supply or receiving facility increases aggregate scale efficiency, those who benefit directly might consider 
compensating former users of those assets for their loss. An effective board will not let local interests interfere with 
strategic initiatives that generate net gains—it will use local representatives to help identify mutually acceptable terms 
of trade among patron owners. 
From this perspective, rather than view governance as a bottom-up representational process, perhaps it is useful to 
think of it as an effective organizational strategy to build and sustain patron loyalty. Under this view, cooperative 
leaders should take care to recruit board members who will be effective ambassadors, and then take the time to 
develop a corporate strategy collectively. If each board member contributes to that strategy, and feels ownership of it, 
collectively the board can be a powerful advocate for the cooperative among patrons. 
Recruiting effective board members is a practical challenge for cooperative managers and directors. Elections for 
board seats often are not competitive (Reynolds, 2004). The panel of cooperative experts cited by others in this 
special theme identified recruiting new directors as the most important governance issue facing cooperatives. The 
additional data reported in Bond and Bhuyan in their article in this theme suggests that the problem is most acute 
among younger patrons. 
Participating on a board requires significant time, and exposes members to financial and legal risk. Viewing board 
participation as an economic choice, there must be some compensation for these costs to attract new members. In 
public-stock companies, board members are normally salaried with benefits and performance-based pay. Further, 
there are substantial nonmonetary benefits that accrue from the opportunity to strengthen and expand productive 
social networks. Farmer cooperatives typically do not pay salaries to directors, and the potential networking benefits 
from participating arguably are more limited. 
Individual farmers do have an economic interest in participating on the board as patron owners, but collectively they 
face a free-riding problem. One potential solution is greater pay. While seemingly an obvious solution, there are likely 
less obvious, but nevertheless good, reasons why most cooperatives do not choose to pay their directors significant 
salaries. Complementary with pay is investing significantly in recruitment, and providing public recognition for board contributions. A formal director nomination and recruiting committee is one kind of investment. Some highly 
functioning boards also commit CEO and director time to farm visits of prospective board members. These visits can 
be used as opportunities to explain the unique impact of cooperative generally, and the special commitment required 
of individual members to on-going cooperative success. 
Concluding Comments 
Cooperatives play an important, and arguably undervalued, role in agricultural markets. To the extent that market 
maturity masks their procompetitive effect, cooperative managers and directors lack quantitative evidence to 
document firm value to patrons and policy makers. Governing cooperatives in this context suggests a need to focus 
on recruiting and training directors who can credibly communicate unique cooperative value to patrons, and who 
understand the need to negotiate toward a value maximizing strategy. As researchers are able to better document 
and quantify the unique impact and importance of cooperatives, the organizations’ leaders will have more tools at 
their disposal to explain value to their peers. 
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